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DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL OBliGATIONS: THE 
QUEST FOR WORLD PATENT lAW 
HARMONIZATION 
ADAM ISAAC HASSON* 
Abstract: Most all nations recognize the need to protect intellectual 
property in some form due to its potential value. In 1994, the signatory 
nations of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade signed the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs), an ambitious international convention that set forth an 
international baseline for patent, copyright, and trademark protection. 
In addition to providing procedures for the settlement of property 
disputes, one practical effect of TRIPs has been the harmonization of 
the world's patent laws. In 1994, the United States passed the Uruguay 
Round Agreement Act, legislation that implemented several changes to 
domestic patent law required by TRIPs. Although opinions, especially 
those of developing nations, debate the fairness of TRIPs, the 
Agreement represents an effective balance among competing interests 
and a m~or step towards world patent law harmonization. 
INTRODUCTION 
The international protection of intellectual property has been a 
global issue of paramount importance since the nineteenth century.1 
Nearly all countries acknowledge the need to protect intellectual 
property in some form, recognizing that intellectual property "is an 
asset derived from the discovery or creation of a new product, proc-
ess, or information "2 that has commercial value. Since nearly all 
traded goods operate under patent, copyright, or trademark protec-
* Adam Isaac Hasson is the Editor in Chief of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review. 
1 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1 (Marshall A. Leaffer ed., 2d 
ed. 1997) (providing that the first international agreements concerned with the interna-
tional protection of intellectual property were the Union of Paris for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works ( 1886)). 
2 Alexander A. Caviedes, International Copyright Law: Should the European Union Dictate its 
Development?, 16B.U. INT'LLJ.165, 166 (1998). 
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tion, the fair and economic conduct of international trade is depend-
ent upon secure intellectual property rights.3 The protection of ana-
tion's intellectual property rights abroad can be a critical issue in the 
development of that nation's economy.4 Lack of international protec-
tion for the products of intellectual property can result in the loss of 
millions of dollars in profits as a result of international piracy.5 Aware 
of the need to protect these valuable assets from piracy, the nations of 
the world sought to provide clear guidelines for intellectual property 
protection.6 
It is often difficult, however, to persuade a country to alter its in-
tellectual property laws in order to protect the assets of its interna-
tional trading partners. 7 With the concerns of both developed and 
developing nations in mind, the signatory nations8 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) signed the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (hereinafter 
TRIPs or Agreement) on Aprill5, 1994, at the conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round of negotiations.9 
The TRIPs Agreement is commonly viewed as the "most ambi-
tious international intellectual property convention ever attempted. "10 
By building upon the conventions of the past, n the Agreement sets 
forth an international baseline for patent, copyright, and trademark 
protection, in addition to enforcement and dispute resolution meas-
ures.l2 This Note provides a detailed analysis of the TRIPs provisions 
regarding international patent protection. Part I reviews the basics of 
patent law necessary to fully understand the TRIPs provisions regard-
ing patent protection. Part II follows with a brief synopsis of the rele-
3 John E. Guist, Noncompliance with TRIPs lry Developed and Developing Countries: Is TRIPs 
Working?, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 69, 69 (1997). 
4 Marshall]. Welch, International Protection of Intellectual Property, 1 TEx. INTELL. PROP. 
LJ. 41, 41 (1992). 
5 See Lara E. Ewens, Seed Wars: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the Quest for High 
Yield Seeds, 23 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 285, 305 (2000). 
6 See id. 
7 Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen Intellectual Property 
Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 9 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. 
J. 241, 243 (1998). 
8 For a listing of the countries that have accepted the Uruguay Round of GATT nego-
tiations, see INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 587. 
9 Id. at585. 
1o Guist, supra note 3, at 70. 
11 The Paris Convention and the Berne Convention are the major intellectual property 
conventions that preceded TRIPs. See INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY, supra note 1, at 1. 
12 Lippert, supra note 7, at 273. 
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vant TRIPs provlSlons concerning international patent protection. 
Part III examines the U.S.' implementation of these obligations under 
domestic patent laws. Part IV seeks to answer whether the United 
States has implemented its international obligations under the TRIPs 
Agreement. Finally, Part V identifies relevant obstacles to world patent 
law harmonization and suggests methods whereby full harmonization 
may be possible. 
I. THE BAsics OF PATENT LAw 
A patent is a government grant of a monopoly on an invention 
for a term of years, after which, the technology enters the public do-
main.I3 Patents protect the fundamental elements of inventions and 
emerging technologies and are available to protect either a product, 
machine, composition, or process.I4 The patent not only describes the 
invention but also gives the owner the right to exclude others from 
producing, using, or selling the invention without consent.15 In order 
for an invention to be patentable, it must possess a minimum degree 
of non-obviousness, usefulness, and novelty.16 
Domestic patent laws have dual functionsP They stimulate sci-
entific research by rewarding inventors with limited monopolies on 
their inventions while fostering economic benefits for the inventors' 
nation.18 Without the security provided by the TRIPs Agreement 
against international piracy, the benefits provided by patents likely 
would be frustrated, and a nation's economy and trade ultimately 
would suffer.19 
II. THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 
The GATT negotiations commenced at the conclusion of World 
War II, when the nations of the world recognized the desirability of 
13 See Welch, supra note 4, at 42. 
14 MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 
0.6 (1999). 
15 !d. 
16 !d. (explaining that an invention fails to meet the non-obviousness criterion if the 
differences between the invention and the prior art would be obvious to a hypothetical 
person skilled in the field to which the invention pertains). 
17 See id. 
18 See Welch, supra note 4, at 42. 
19 See id. 
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international trade agreements.2° Established in 1948, GATI is a mul-
tilateral instrument governing international trade aimed at reducing 
trade barriers.21 The Uruguay Round, the most recent of several 
rounds of GATT negotiations, created the TRIPs Agreement.22 TRIPs 
is primarily the result of concern among developed countries that 
lobbied for protection against international piracy of intellectual 
property rights.23 
The Uruguay Round also established the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) to oversee GATT and TRIPs.24 Developed signatories 
support the WTO because it promotes enhanced enforcement of 
rights in developing countries by undertaking a proactive trade sur-
veillance role.25 
The TRIPs Agreement, signed in 1994, formally recognizes the 
need to promote "effective and appropriate means for the enforce-
ment" of intellectual property rights, and provides for "expeditious 
procedures for the multilateral prevention and settlement of dis-
putes" relating to private intellectual property rights.26 The practical 
effect on patents has been the harmonization of the world's patent 
laws.27 To this end, TRIPs requires that all signatories enact domestic 
legislation to implement the minimum levels of patent protection 
provided by the Agreement.28 Thus, developed and non-developed 
signatories alike must adhere to an international baseline for patent 
protection29 and ensure effective, expeditious, and impartial applica-
tion of patent rights.30 
20 John G. Byrne, Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An Overview of the 
Changes Required by GAIT, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 121, 125 (1995). 
2I !d. at 126. 
22 Seeid. at 126-27. 
23 Michael O'Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copyright Holders in the Inter-
net Age, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1, 12 (2000). 
24 See G. BRUCE DOERN, GLOBAL CHANGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGENCIES 93 
(1999). 
25 See id. 
26 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, pre-
amble, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 
(1994), available at http:/ /www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agmo_e.htm (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2001) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement). 
27 See Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F. 3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
28 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1 ( 1). 
29 Lippert, supra note 7, at 253. 
30 O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 13. 
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The TRIPs Agreement also sets forth the criteria for patentable 
subject matter.31 Article 27 provides that, "[ a patent] shall be avail-
able for any invention ... in all fields of technology, provided that 
they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial 
application. "32 Thus, TRIPs requires a patent be made available for 
any invention, product, or process, regardless of its field of technol-
ogy. 33 In addition, Article 27 sets forth clear guidelines for subject 
matter that may not be patentable.34 These exceptions include inven-
tions necessary to "protect ordre public or morality," "diagnostic, thera-
peutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals," 
and naturally existing plants, animals, and "essentially biological pro-
cesses for the production of plants or animals. "35 
Furthermore, TRIPs provides that the rights set forth apply to all 
Members, thereby disposing of the past use of reciprocity.36 Under the 
National Treatment clauses, each signatory is compelled to accord to 
the nationals of other Member States "treatment no less favorable 
than it accords to its own nationals" with regard to the protection of 
patents.~17 Moreover, TRIPs applies the most favored nation principle 
in affording patent protection.38 Thus, with few exceptions, "any ad-
vantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the 
nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the nationals of all other Members. "39 
TRIPs also sets forth the basic rights that must be accorded to 
each Member's nationals.40 Article 28 provides that a patent grants an 
inventor the right to prohibit third parties from making, using, sell-
ing, offering to sell, or importing the subject matter of a patent.41 In 
51 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 27. 
52 /d. art. 27(1). 
35 /d.; Guist, supra note 3, at 72. However, the TRIPs Agreement fails to define "inven-
tion." Although patents traditionally are available for useful inventions, advances in bio-
technology are blurring this line. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 198 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. \Usef 
eds., 1998). 
MTRIPsAgreement, supra note 26, art. 27(2), (3). 
35 /d. art. 27 (2), (3)(a), (b). 
56 See O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 14. Reciprocity is defined as "the mutual concession 
of advantages or privileges for the purpose of commercial ... relations." BLAcK's LAw 
DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999). 
57 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 3(1). 
!!8 See id. art. 4. 
59 /d. 
40 /d. art. 28. 
41 /d. art. 28(1). 
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addition, the term of a patent under TRIPs was extended to twenty 
years.42 
TRIPs provides for a delayed schedule for its entry into force in 
developing countries.43 Pursuant to Article 65, developing Members 
were entitled to delay implementation of TRIPs for four years.44 In the 
case of the least developed Members, application of TRIPs is delayed 
for ten years.45 The leniency expressed in these articles allows a devel-
oping country an opportunity to slowly adapt and further expand its 
economy prior to compliance.46 
These clauses represent the concessions made by developed na-
tions in order to acquire the consent of the under developed Mem-
bers.47 The developing Members, rightfully contending that stringent 
protection of intellectual property would further impede their devel-
opment, initially believed that TRIPs would result in a loss of their 
sovereignty and increased dependence on more developed signato-
ries.48 However, many such nations ultimately assented, believing that 
the potential gains from freer trade were "irresistible. "49 Thus, imme-
diate compliance with TRIPS was not required of all Members. 5° 
Enforcement provisions were considered essential to realizing 
TRIPs' intent.51 Article 41 provides that each Member "shall ensure 
that enforcement procedures ... are available under [domestic] law 
so as to permit effective" and expeditious remedies against any act of 
patent infringement.52 Thus, all Members are required to ensure that 
enforcement procedures are available under their laws.53 Further-
more, many procedural safeguards are present in the Agreement.54 
42 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 33. 
43 !d. art. 65 (2). 
44 /d. Developed countries were required to comply with TRIPs' provisions by 1996, 
with developing nations' compliance delayed until January 1, 2000. Intellectual Property 
Rights, at http:/ /www.cid.harvard.edu.cidtradelssues/ipr.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). 
45 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 66 ( 1). 
46 See Guist, supra note 3, at 79. 
4' See Lippert, supra note 7, at 273. 
48 See id. 
49 Id. at 273. Increases in trade actually may be the result of avoidance of the U.S.' 
"Super 301" processes, a process where the U.S. Trade Representative can withhold intel-
lectual property trade benefits if countries present an unfair burden to American trade. /d. 
at 273 n.152. For further information on Special 301 processes, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-
2420 (1994). 
50 See Guist, supra note 3, at 79. 
51 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 41(1). 
52 Id. 
53 See id. 
54 Seeid. art. 41(3). 
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Under TRIPs, all patent infringement actions must be: (1) decided on 
the merits; (2) in writing; and (3) reasoned only upon evidence after 
each party thereto is afforded an opportunity to be heard.55 In addi-
tion, a party is entitled to judicial review of administrative decisions. 56 
In providing remedies for a contesting state, judicial authorities are 
permitted to award judgment in the form of an injunction, damages, 
and even an order that the infringing goods be destroyed without 
compensation. 57 
Moreover, the TRIPs Agreement formally recognizes the need for 
procedures for multilateral prevention and settlement of disputes.58 
For example, TRIPs provides a suitable binding dispute resolution 
procedure that former international intellectual property conventions 
lacked.59 Under Article 64, the dispute settlement procedures set 
forth in GATT are made applicable to patent dispute resolution and 
are to be monitored by the Council for TRIPs.6° Furthermore, all sig-
natories are required to abide by the decisions of the Dispute Settle-
ment Body of the WT0.61 The Dispute Settlement Body, consisting of 
a panel of three Members to make initial decisions and another three 
Member appellate panel, possesses the authority to make findings or 
recommendations, and may authorize a country to take reprisals 
against an erring WTO Member.62 
Thus, the TRIPs Agreement laid the foundation for the interna-
tional protection ofpatents.63 Not only were all signatories required to 
join the WT0,64 but they also were compelled to adapt their domestic 
patent laws, pursuant to TRIPs, in exchange for mutual protection of 
intellectual property.65 Some of these required changes, discussed be-
low, compelled the United States to expand the scope of patent in-
fringement actions, permit consideration of evidence of inventive ac-
55 !d. 
56 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 41 ( 4). 
57 !d. arts. 44(1), 45(1), 46. 
56 See generally id. 
59 See O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 15. 
60 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 64(1),(3). The Council for TRIPs is a body 
that examines the scope and modality of complaints provided for under the Agreement. 
See id. art. 68. 
61 O'Sullivan, supra note 23, at 15. 
62 Intellectual Property Provisions of GAIT, at http:/ /www.ladas.com/ gatt.html (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2000). 
63 See generally TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26. 
64 Byrne, supra note 20, at 129. 
65 See generally id. 
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tivity abroad in patent prosecution, and expand the term of a patent 
to twenty years.66 
Ill. DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
Similar to any international treaty, TRIPs established interna-
tional obligations for its signatories.67 These obligations are made 
binding upon WfO Member States through the force of international 
law.68 In the United States, however, the implementation of TRIPs 
faced certain obstacles because patent law is an area delegated to the 
U.S. Congress.69 As a result, TRIPs was not self-executing and required 
implementing legislation.7° Furthermore, under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, any treaty provision that is inconsistent with the laws of the 
United States is void.71 
The Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994 (URAA) 72 approved 
TRIPs and began the modification of domestic patent law in order to 
execute the U.S.' international obligations. 73 This act was signed by 
President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1994, and included the 
required changes to U.S. intellectual property law in order to imple-
ment GATT and TRIPs.74 GATT, however, was not intended to trump 
domestic legislation.75 Section 102(a) of the URAA reinforces the 
premise that, "No provision ... that is inconsistent with any law of the 
U. S. shall have effect."76 Thus, where a conflict arises, domestic, not 
international, law binds the courts of the United States. 77 
The URAA implemented several changes to domestic patent 
law.78 Among these were: (I) expansion of the scope of infringement 
66 See id. at 129-30. 
67 Andres Moncayo von Hase, The Application and Interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Inte0ectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: THE TluPS AGREEMENT, supra note 33, at 106. 
68 See id. 
69 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 8, d. 8. 
7o See von Hase, supra note 67, at 108. 
71 See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI,§ 1, d. 2; see also 19 U.S.C. § 104 (1999). 
72 Uruguay Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4814 (1994) 
[hereinafter URAA]. 
75 See von Hase, supra note 67, at 109-10. 
74 SIMENSKY, supra note 14, at 0.6. 
75 Suramerica de Aleacuiones Laminadas, CA. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 668 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
76URAA, supra note 72, § 102(a). 
77 See von Hase, supra note 67, at 111. 
78 See generally DRAA, supra note 72. 
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actions to include offers to sell;79 (2) the use of inventive actiVIty 
abroad to satisfY the date of invention criteria for patent applica-
tions;80 (3) the extension of patent protection to a term of twenty 
years;81 ( 4) the publishing of patent applications eighteen months 
after filing;82 and ( 5) the creation of a provisional application. 83 Only 
changes one, two, and three are discussed herein, as these are the 
modifications specifically required by TRIPs. 84 
A. Offers to Sell 
Prior to TRIPs, the United States stood apart from its developed 
peers in limiting suits for infringement to cases in which actual sales 
of patented inventions were alleged.85 Thus, prior to the 1994 
amendments, the holder of a U.S. patent only had the right to ex-
clude others from "mak[ing], us[ing] or sell[ing] the patented inven-
tion in the U.S."86 This language was construed strictly so that neither 
intent nor preparation to sell would constitute infringement.87 
The U.S.' trading partners, on the other hand, favored an ex-
panded cause of action for infringement that included offers to sell 
patented inventions.88 For example, in the English case Gerber Garment 
Tech, Inc. v. Lectra Sys. Ltd.,89 the Patents Court held that mere advertis-
ing provided a cause of action for the infringement of a patented 
product.90 Moreover, countries such as France and Belgium also al-
lowed a cause of action for offers to sell in their domestic patent laws 
prior to 1994.91 
79 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (1984), amended lry 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (Supp. I 1994); see also 
URAA, supra note 72, § 533(a). 
80 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1984), amended lry 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (Supp. I. 1994); see 
also URAA, supra note 72, § 531 (a). 
81 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1984), amended lry 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. I 1994); see 
also URAA, supra note 72, § 532(a). 
82 35 U.S. C.§ 122(b) (1), amended lry 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (1) (Supp. I. 1996). 
83 35 u.s.c. § 111 (b) (1) (1994). 
84 See Byrne, supra note 20, at 131-33. 
85 Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
86 35 U.S.C. § 27l(a) (1984). 
87 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 915 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
88 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at FRA 11, BEL. 
9 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1995). 
89 13 R.P.C. 383, 411-12 (United Kingdom Patents Ct. 1995), cited in Rotec Indus., 215 
F.3d at 1251. 
90 !d. 
91 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 88, at FRA. 11, 
BEL. 9. 
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Thus, as a result of pressure from the U.S.' trading partners, 
TRIPs required the implementation of domestic legislation that en-
compassed offers to sell.92 In 1994, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 (a) to include offers to sell as an additional basis for infringe-
ment.93 Today, a court may find infringement when the first element 
of contract formation, the offer, is satisfied.94 
Proponents of the expanded protection assert that including of-
fers to sell strengthens patent protection by giving the patent holder 
increased protection from a wider array of infringing activity.95 The 
goal of this expanded cause of action is the reduction of international 
patent piracy.96 Despite this expansion, however, the courts of the 
United States, while acknowledging that common law offers to sell 
would suffice for infringement,97 have construed some aspects of the 
amended statute narrowly.98 Although the statute fails to define "offer 
to sell,"99 the courts have interpreted the statute to require the offer 
to sell to have occurred within the United States.100 In Rotec Indus. v. 
Mitsubishi Corp.,lol for example, the Federal Circuit held that in-
fringement could not be predicated upon acts or offers that occurred 
wholly in a foreign country. There, the court denied the plaintiff's 
request for relief because the defendant had made offers to sell a U.S. 
patented invention in China.102 
92 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 28(1). 
93 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (Supp. I 1994). 
94 A.K Stamping Co. v. Instrument Specialties Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 627, 665 (D.NJ. 
2000) (holding that the "norms of traditional contract law should be the basis for" deter-
mining whether an offer to sell has been made); Robert Ryan Morishita, Patent Infringement 
After GAIT: "'hat is an Offer to Sell?, 3 UTAH L. REv. 905, 909 (1997). 
95 See Morishita, supra note 94, at 912. 
96 See id. at 912 n.55. 
97 See generally Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1246. 
98 See generally id. 
99 Congress did not provide much guidance on what constitutes an offer except to say 
that the sale should "occur before the expiration date of the term of the patent." 35 U.S.C. 
§271(i). 
1oo &tee Indus., 215 F.3d at 1249 (citing Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow 
Co., 235 U.S. 641,650 (1915)). 
101 !d. 
102 !d. Lower courts have followed this holding. In Ecological Sys. Tech., lP v. Wildlife Eco-
systems, LLC, the court held that "offer to sell liability under the patent infringement stat-
ute is interpreted according to its ordinary meaning in contract law." 142 F. Supp.2d 122, 
125 (D. Mass. 2000). "In analyzing whether a defendant's conduct [amounts] to an offer to 
sell, [the courts look] for evidence that the relevant parties discussed price, quantity and 
delivery dates." !d. at 126. Compare with 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aarotech Lab., Inc., 160 F.3d 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), where the defendant was held liable for patent infringement when 
he sent numerous letters listing the price and describing merchandise for sale to compa-
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B. Foreign Activity 
Unlike its trading partners, the United States awards a patent to 
the party who is the "first to invent. "1°3 Prior to TRIPs and its enabling 
legislation, the United States discriminated against foreign inventors 
by not giving consideration to inventive activity that occurred 
abroad.104 Thus, only when an inventor brought his work to the 
United States was the date of invention set.105 
However, due to European trading partners' objections to this 
rule, the United States was required to amend its legislation in pursuit 
of global harmonization of patent law.106 Although the "first to invent" 
criteria is still the norm, the 1994 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 104 al-
lows foreign inventors to rely on any inventive activity in any WTO 
Member nation to satisfY the invention date on a U.S. patent applica-
tion.107 
C. The Twenty Year Term 
Prior to the passage of TRIPs, a patent issued in the United States 
was valid for seventeen years from the date of issuance.l08 TRIPs ex-
tended this period to twenty years from the date of filing the applica-
tion.109 This change was implemented by the 1994 Amendments to 
the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154)10 
This modification has been controversial for several reasons, in-
cluding the fact that the extension actually may result in shortened 
enjoyment of patent protection because the time period begins to 
elapse from the time of filing.111 Since TRIPs requires the patent term 
to commence at the date of filing, rather than the date of issue, the 
nies in California. !d. at 1379. These activities infringed the plaintiff's patent because they 
constituted a common law offer to sell within the territory of the United States See id. 
1°3 Byrne, supra note 20, at 131. Trading partners have implemented the "first to file" 
system. See id. 
104 !d.; see also J .H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Pruperty Protec-
tion Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 33, at 30. 
105 See Byrne, supra note 20, at 131. 
106 See id. 
107 Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (Supp. I 1994). 
1os Byrne, supra note 20, at 129. 
109 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 33. The term of protection may be in excess 
of twenty years. !d. 
11o 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (Supp. I 1994); Reichman, supra note 104, at 30 n.43. 
lll See Byrne, supra note 20, at 129-30. 
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period of patent protection may actually decrease because of lengthy 
time delays commonly incumbent upon patent prosecution.112 
N. HAs THE UNITED STATES FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS IN PATENT 
PROTECTION AND HARMONIZATION? 
There is little doubt that the TRIPs Agreement and the U.S.' im-
plementation thereof represent positive steps towards the harmoniza-
tion of world patent law.m Much of the legislative activity that re-
sulted from TRIPs has helped to reduce international piracy of 
patented inventions.114 In addition, many of the TRIPs provisions ef-
fectively balance the concerns of the diverse GATT signatories, in-
cluding developed and non-developed countries, as well as among the 
United States, Europe, andAsia.m 
Not all GATT Member States whole-heartedly supported the 
WfO and TRIPs, however.116 Developing states initially supported 
TRIPs predecessor, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations dedicated to 
promoting the protection of intellectual property, because its policies 
favored reduced adherence to international intellectual property laws, 
and thus promoted progressive growth and development.117 These 
countries argued that TRIPs is an instrument of the West created to 
assert unilateral property claims because products originating from 
the Third World do not meet the criteria for protection.118 
In contrast, the United States and Europe favored a stronger 
WfO and the TRIPs Agreement because of their desire to effectively 
and judiciously enforce patent rights through the WfO's dispute set-
tlement procedures, particularly in key developing countries that had 
not rigorously enforced intellectual property rights.ll9 Proponents of 
international intellectual property rights assert that strengthening 
112 Id. Patent prosecution is the process of obtaining a patent from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL AGE 134 (2000). The time and effort required to prosecute a patent varies 
immensely, ranging from two years in average cases, to decades in cases where several in-
ventors claim they were the first to invent a particular invention. ld. 
113 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
114 See Morishita, supra note 94, at 912. 
115 See Doern, supra note 24, at 94. 
116 See id. at 93. 
117 WoRLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, at http:/ /www.wipo.org./about-
wipo/ en/ overview.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2001). 
118 Ewens, supra note 5, at 304. 
119 Doern, supra note 24, at 93. 
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intellectual property rights creates only a transitional loss for develop-
ing countries while promising long-term gains of enhanced employ-
ment, economic development, and new innovations.12o 
Arguably, TRIPs struck an effective balance among these compet-
ing concerns.121 In exchange for the pledge of under-developed coun-
tries to commence harmonization of their patent laws, those countries 
were given additional time in which to comply with TRIPs,122 This 
compromise reassured the developed nations of GATT that all signa-
tories would be required to protect their lawfully held patents over 
time, while under-developed members were assured that their eco-
nomic development would not be suppressed.123 At present, however, 
several developing nations that were required to be in full compliance 
by 2000 have indicated that they were not able to implement their 
TRIPs obligations as required.l24 
In addition to providing equitable treatment for signatories, the 
TRIPs Agreement succeeded in harmonizing the criteria for patent-
able subject matter,l25 Although Members do have some flexibility in 
determining what matters can be excluded from patentability,126 pat-
ents among all Members must be granted to any invention that is 
"new, involve[s] an inventive step and [is] capable of industrial appli-
cation. "127 Moreover, TRIPs allows for future flexibility by permitting 
Members to implement more extensive protection than is required by 
the Agreement.l28 Thus, as countries further develop and recognize 
the need for greater intellectual property protection, TRIPs will adapt 
to those needs.129 
Furthermore, TRIPs compelled the United States to equalize the 
protection for patents afforded by many of its European trading part-
ners.l30 By requiring the inclusion of offers to sell as a basis for in-
fringement, the United States conformed to the patent laws held by 
120 Lippert, supra note 7, at 247, Marie Wilson, TRIPS Agreement Implications for ASEAN 
Protection of Computer Technology, 4 ANN. SuRv. INT'L & CoMP. L. 18, 22-23 (1997). 
121 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 65. 
122 See id. 
123 See generally id. 
124 Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 44. 
125 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 27. 
126 CoRREA, supra note 33, at 193. 
127 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 27 ( 1). 
128 !d. art 1 ( 1). 
129 See id. 
130 Seeid. art. 28(1). 
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many European nations.131 Thus, the European Members of WTO 
gained further protection for their patents within their countries and 
in the United States, while the United States, TRIPs' chief proponent, 
received similar protection)32 
V. Is WoRLD PATENT LAw HARMONIZED? 
Despite its ambitious provisions, TRIPs has had notable short-
comings, and in these respects, has had limited success in harmoniz-
ing world patent law.l33 The major obstacle in the harmonization of 
patent law has been the U.S.' refusal to shift to a "first to file" system 
of patentability.l34 While many European nations have implemented a 
"first to file" system of patentability, the United States persistently dif-
fers by maintaining its system of "first to invent. "135 This difference has 
resulted in numerous "disputes among native and foreign inventors," 
involving the question of which party merits a patent for its inven-
tion.136 
TRIPs has attempted to remedy this obstacle to the extent possi-
ble by requiring the most favored nation status and through compel-
ling the United States to consider inventive activity abroad.l37 While 
not perfectly harmonized, these adaptations seek to level the playing 
field between these opposing systems.138 However, further disputes 
may be inevitable.139 
Another shortcoming of TRIPs that has prevented the full reali-
zation of international patent law harmonization is that the Agree-
ment fails to mention the European Patent Office (EP0).140 The 
European Patent Convention (EPC), which created the EPO, was 
signed on October 5, 1973.141 The EPC sought to unify patent law 
131 See INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 88, at 
FRA. 11, BEL. 9. 
132 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 28. 
133 See Byrne, supra note 20, at 135. 
134 Jd. 
135 See id.; see generally INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra 
note 88, at FRA. 6--10. 
136 Byrne, supra note 20, at 135. 
137 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 26, art. 3 ( 1). 
138 See id; Alice Macandrew, It's Boom Time for New York's IP Lawyers, 52 MANAGING IN-
TELL. PROP. 5, 5 (1995). 
139 Byrne, supra note 20, at 135. 
140 SeeT935/97 IBM/Computer Programs, [1999) E.P.O.R. 301, at II. 
141 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 673. The 
following states are party to the European Patent Convention: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
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within the European Communityl42 and permitted the EPO to issue a 
European Patent.l43 While decisions emanating from the EPO indi-
cate that there is a desire to apply the EPC in conformity with TRIPs, 
it is not clear whether TRIPs is binding on the EPC.I44 In 
IBM/Computer Programs, the EPO's Technical Board of Appeals, while 
accepting TRIPs with reservations, indicated that, "it [was] not con-
vinced that TRIPs may be applied directly to the EPC. "145 Thus, be-
cause the EPO is not a Member of the WfO and did not sign the 
TRIPs Agreement, only Member States and not the EPO itself are le-
gally bound by TRIPs,l46 
Although the EPO gives deference to TRIPs,147 the failure of 
TRIPs to reference the EPO represents a hurdle to the harmonization 
of world patent law.148 One might wonder how world patent law could 
ever be harmonized if the EPO, the body that issues patents for an 
entire continent, is not bound by the same standards as its Member 
States and their trading partners.149 
The WfO has a challenging task at hand, for it must continue to 
secure compliance with TRIPs provisions as well as address emerging 
issues in international intellectual property law.150 Some analysts assert 
that TRIPs implementation by under-developed Member States will 
have a devastating impact upon them.I51 One feared impact is that 
TRIPs, in its promotion of patent right protection, will make pharma-
ceuticals more expensive in developing nations where the need for 
such medications is paramount.152 
Despite these concerns, business interests refuse to compromise, 
contending that enough additional time has been allocated to non-
complying, under-developed states.l53 In the future, TRIPs will be 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. /d. at 674. 
142 /d. 
14~ European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 2(1), 13l.L.M. 268 (1974). 
144 IBM/ Computer Programs, [ 1999] E.P.O.R. at VII, 2.3. 
145 /d. at VII, 2.1. 
146 /d. 
147 /d. at V. 
148 See id. at VII, 2.3. 
149 See generaUy IBM/ Computer Programs, [1999] E.P.O.R. at VII, 2.3. 
150 Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 44. 
151 /d. 
152 /d. 
153 /d. 
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forced to adapt if it is to endure, and the WTO will need to find a 
method to arbitrate these competing interests. 1M 
CONCLUSION 
TRIPs has been criticized as the direct result of a coercive strategy 
on behalf of the United States to force under-developed countries to 
pass laws that would protect U.S. patents. In spite of these criticisms, 
TRIPs remains an effective compromise that, while imperfect, has 
taken unprecedented steps towards the harmonization of world pat-
ent law. 
One must remember in analyzing TRIPs that the Agreement 
foremost represents a compromise. As with any compromise, it bal-
ances the needs and desires of all Members in order to fulfill a com-
mon goal. Despite its shortcomings, TRIPs has led to a realization of 
many of its goals. Not only has TRIPs led to the increased protection 
of patents by recognizing an offer to sell as a basis for infringement, 
but the Agreement also has sought to treat all Member States equally 
by implementing the most favored nation status, while at the same 
time making concessions to those states in need of additional compli-
ance time due to their socio-economic positions. 
Furthermore, the United States, while differing from other 
Member States by maintaining its "first to invent" standard, has done 
its part to implement the goals of TRIPs effectively. With the several 
changes implemented by the 1994 amendments pursuant to the 
URAA, the United States has displayed its willingness to alter its do-
mestic legislation in order to serve global and domestic goals. As a 
result, despite claimed coercive tactics, the United States has set the 
example for future international intellectual property protection. 
154 See id. 
